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Resumen
La evidencia empírica ha rechazado de manera consistente la paridad descubierta de tasas de interés y
la existencia de una alta correlación de los consumos de los países. Este trabajo investiga la
importancia de mercados financieros imperfectamente integrados en estos dos temas. Bajo estos
mercados, se propone una estructura donde la condición que relaciona consumos y tipo de cambio real
junto a la paridad de tasas se ven afectadas por la Posición de Inversión Internacional (PII) del país.
Primero, encontramos evidencia para algunos países de la OECD que la PII contribuiría a explicar la
falta de correlación de los consumos. Asimismo, en términos de la paridad de tasas, la PII es capaz de
capturar un premio por riesgo para un pequeño grupo de países en el corto plazo.
Abstract
Empirical evidence against both risk-sharing across countries and the uncovered interest rate parity
(UIP) condition has been extensively documented. This paper investigates the empirical implications
of imperfectly integrated financial markets resulting from these two issues. Under this asset market
structure both the risk-sharing condition and the UIP are affected by the Net Foreign Assets Position
(NFA) of the country. First, we find strong evidence for OECD countries that the NFA contributes to
explaining the lack of risk-sharing across countries. Similarly, in terms of the UIP, the NFA is able to
capture a time-varying risk-premium for a small group of countries over short-term horizons.
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Two important issues in international macroeconomics are the apparent lack
of risk sharing across countries and the UIP failure.1 However, models with
integrated ﬁnancial markets and complete markets lead to a risk-sharing con-
dition in which the real exchange rate is as persistent as the ratio of marginal
utilities across countries, and the expected change in the nominal exchange rate
is proportional to the interest rate diﬀerential.2
Regarding risk-sharing across countries, previous work has studied diﬀerent
data sets, and used diverse empirical techniques to test risk-sharing conditions
that arise under the assumption of both complete and incomplete markets (see
e.g. Backus and Smith (1993), Kollmann (1995) and Obstfeld (1989)). Recently,
Ravn (2001) and Head, Mattina and Smith (2002), in the line of previous ﬁnd-
ings, present evidence that an exogenous incomplete asset market structure,
hereafter bond economy, is not supported empirically. Thus, the real exchange
rate would not play a role in explaining the risk-sharing across countries. This
evidence questions the empirical plausibility of recent theories of international
business cycles that associate a key and signiﬁc a n tr o l et ot h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e
in breaking the link of consumption across countries.
On the other hand, it is widely accepted that the hypothesis that interest
rate diﬀerentials are unbiased predictors of the nominal exchange rate performs
poorly in the data.3 Froot and Thaler (1990), in an extensive empirical testing,
ﬁnd striking evidence against the UIP. More recently, Chinn and Meredith
(2002), hereafter CM, report that the UIP does not hold over short horizons,
and present evidence suggesting that it may hold over long horizons. Bekaert,
Wei and Xing (2002) ﬁnd that one reason for Chinn and Meredith’s claim that
UIP holds better at longer horizons is simply a sample choice.
Recent theoretical studies have started to assign an explicit role to the cur-
rent account and the net foreign asset position (NFA) in the transmission mech-
anism of shocks across countries, after being relegated to a secondary role in
previous developments.4 Selaive and Tuesta (2003) examine the role played by
1Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) list the risk-sharing puzzle among the central unresolved
puzzles in international macroeconomics.
2Scholars have incorporated an exogenous risk-premium to explain the UIP failure.
3The coeﬃcient on interest rate diﬀerentials in exchange rate prediction equations turns
out to be negative and signiﬁcant unlike the unitary value that theory predicts.
4The stationarity and tractability problems associated with these models may had been
t h em a i nr e a s o nt od os o .
1the NFA in breaking the link between real exchange rate and relative con-
sumption. Their main theoretical contribution is that under the assumption of
imperfect ﬁnancial integration the NFAplays a role in explaining the apparent
lack of risk-sharing across countries.5 Cavallo and Ghironi (2002), in an over-
lapping generation model, try to rationalize the role of the NFA in explaining
the permanent US´ real exchange rate appreciation.
From an empirical perspective, Gagnon (1996) reports a robust long-run
relationship between real exchange rate and NFA in a panel of twenty OECD
economies. More recently, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000, 2001a, 2001b) analyze
the determinants of the NFAfor a large set of economies, and oﬀer a variety of
theoretical reasons for thinking that some macro variables should have eﬀects
on the NFA. They also provide evidence that the NFAmatters in determining
long-run real interest rate diﬀerentials.6
The goal of this paper is to investigate the importance of the net foreign asset
position in the lack of risk sharing across countries and UIP failure. We test
the imperfect and incomplete asset market structure, following closely Selaive
and Tuesta (2003) and Benigno (2001), in which the NFA plays a crucial role
in breaking the link between the real exchange rate and the ratio of marginal
utilities, and becomes a time-varying risk-premium in the UIP condition.
Two risk-free one period nominal uncontingent bonds are traded, and a
cost of undertaking positions in the international ﬁnancial markets allows us to
characterize an imperfect and incomplete asset market structure. Under this as-
set market structure, and assuming deviations from “purchasing power parity”
(PPP), the NFA breaks the link between the real exchange rate and relative
consumptions that characterize models under complete markets. This result
arises simultaneously with a direct eﬀect of the NFA in both the UIP and
the risk-sharing. In this context, restrictions in the international ﬁnancial mar-
kets preclude countries from smoothing out consumption, limiting risk-sharing
possibilities, and rationalizing the existence of a time-varying risk-premium.
5Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) refer to the discrepancy between the risk sharing
implications of theoretical models and the data as the consumption-real exchange rate anom-
aly. In Selaive and Tuesta (2003) we suggest the need of imperfect ﬁnancial integration in
order to solve this anomaly. In a previous contribution, Benigno (2001) analyses the welfare
implications of monetary policy rules under imperfect and incomplete international ﬁnancial
markets.
6Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) highlight that external wealth plays a critical role in
determining the behavior of trade balance, and also provide some evidence that a portfolio
balance exists: real interest rate diﬀerentials are inversely related to the net foreign asset
positions.
2In terms of the risk-sharing condition, our ﬁndings suggest that growth fac-
tors of consumption and real exchange rates may behave in a manner that is
consistent with a signiﬁcant role for the NFA.W e ﬁnd relatively strong ev-
idence in favor of a risk-sharing relationship that gives an explicit role to the
NFA. For a large sample of countries, the NFAcaptures the smooth consump-
tion possibilities bridging the long lasting gap between theory and data that had
characterized previous works.
Regarding the UIP relationship, our ﬁndings suggest that the NFA can
properly capture a time-varying risk-premium only for a small group of coun-
tries, and also allows us to obtain favorable results in terms of the unbiasedness
hypothesis, i.e., the interest rate diﬀerentials are useful as predictors of short-
term movements in exchange rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂyr e v i e w
the theoretical approach on which we based our testing. In Section 3 we present
some features of the data. In Section 4 we provide an empirical discussion
of both the risk sharing and UIP relationships. In Section 5, we discuss the
econometric issues involved in the estimation. Section 6 provides the results,
and the last section concludes.
2 A Theory of Imperfect Financial Integration
In this section, we brieﬂy present the incomplete asset markets structure that
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), hereafter CKM, used in their work - also
known as bond economy. Markets are perfectly integrated under CKM´s asset
structure. Then, we characterize an incomplete and imperfect ﬁnancial assets
market structure where the NFA enters explicitly in the risk-sharing relation-
ship and also generates deviations from the UIP.
2.1 Incomplete Markets
2.1.1 The Standard Approach: Bond Economy
It is well known that under both domestic and international complete markets,







7The consumers in both economies can trade contingent one-period risk-free nominal bonds.
3where ko is a function of predetermined variables, and qt ≡
StP ∗
t
Pt , with S as the
nominal exchange rate, P∗ as the Foreign price index, and P as the domestic
price index. From (1), we see that the relative consumption across countries is
proportional to the real exchange rate.
On the other hand, several studies on international business cycles have in-
troduced an incomplete asset market structure in which the only asset traded
internationally is a single uncontingent nominal bond.8 Under this asset struc-




















From the above expression the relation between the real exchange rate and mar-
ginal utilities holds in expected ﬁrst diﬀerences.9 As equation (2) illustrates,
the bond economy allows us to break the link between real exchange rate and
relative consumptions. Although this channel was theoretically promising in ad-
dressing the apparent lack of risk-sharing, it failed to explain it.10 Furthermore,
deviations from the UIP are inhibited. On the empirical grounds, evidence
from Obstfeld (1989), Ravn (2001) and Head et al (2002) has cast doubts on
the validity of the bond economy approach used by CKM.
2.1.2 Incomplete and Imperfect Financial Integration
This section follows closely Selaive and Tuesta (2003). In order to break the
monotonic relationship between the real exchange rate and relative consump-
tions we also generate deviations from the UIP. We assume that these devia-
tions stem from a cost of holding foreign bonds that allows us to introduce the
NFA dynamics into the UIP. We may rationalize deviations from PPP either
by deviations from the law of one price or by the presence of nontraded goods.
The conditions characterizing the allocations of domestic and foreign con-
8This asset market structure without further modiﬁcation implies a non-stationary distri-
bution of wealth across countries. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium is not well deﬁned.
9In log-linear form, this expression reads as
Et (b qt+1 − b qt)=Et
h³
b Uc(C∗
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where a caret denotes the deviation from the steady state of the log of the variable.
10C K Mp o i n t e do u tt h a tt h i sr e s u l ts t e m sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tw e a l t he ﬀects in their incom-
plete asset market structure are very small.
4sumption, and holding of nominal bonds are:11
































where β is the intertemporal discount factor, and φ(.) depends on the real
holdings of the foreign assets in the entire economy, and therefore is taken as
given by the domestic household.12
Equations (3) and (4) correspond to the Euler equations of the home and
foreign countries, respectively. Equation (5) represents household H’s Euler
equation derived by maximizing the holdings of the nominal bond denominated
in foreign currency. From these conditions we are able to derive the new un-
covered interest parity and the risk-sharing equilibrium condition. Both are
aﬀected by the net foreign asset position of the domestic economy.
The uncovered interest rate parity is derived by taking the diﬀerence be-
tween the log-linear approximation of equations (3) and (5), and is given by the
following expression:
b it −b i∗
t = Et(St+1 − St) − δbt (6)
Notice that the above equation incorporates a cost of borrowing in foreign
currency and may be consistent with the empirical failure of the UIP.13 In our
case, there is a time varying risk-premium that depends on both the NFA of
the domestic economy, bt, and a cost of bond holdings, δ, that measures the
elasticity of the interest rate diﬀerential to changes in the NFAposition.14 The
higher this elasticity, the larger the eﬀect of the current account channel on the
interest rate diﬀerential. The risk-premium, δbt, could be positive or negative




















. See Selaive and Tuesta
(2003) for the set up used to derive these conditions, and details of the well deﬁned steady
state around which we log-linearize.
12Some restrictions on φ(.) are necessary: φ(0) = 1; assumes the value 1 only if BF,t =0 ;
diﬀerentiable; and decreasing in the neighborhood of zero.
13When the UIP relation holds a regression of exchange rate returns on the interest rate
diﬀerential should give an intercept of zero and a slope coeﬃcient of unity. However, this
hypothesis has been consistently rejected in the data.
14After log-linearizing, δ ≡− φ0 (0)C.
5depending on the Home country being a borrower or a lender in the international
assets market. Observe that this equation implies a negative relation between
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ed i ﬀerential and the NFA of the economy.
The risk-sharing condition under the imperfect ﬁnancial integration we im-
pose here is obtained by combining the UIP and the corresponding Euler equa-
tions for each country, and reads as:
ρEt
³³





b Ct − b C∗
t
´´
= Et (b qt+1 − b qt) − δbt (7)
Equation (7) illustrates the mechanism through which the NFA position af-
fects the risk-sharing. The characterization of this incomplete asset market
structure maintains the gap between relative consumptions that emerges in the
bond economy speciﬁed in equation (2), but now, in addition, the dynamic of
the NFA plays an explicit role. As long as there is either asset accumulation
or decumulation, the real exchange rate will be aﬀected by the NFA,a n dt h e
link between the real exchange rate and relative consumptions will be broken
down. Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relation between the real exchange
rate and the NFA, i.e., an asset accumulation implies a real exchange rate
appreciation. The larger the asset accumulation the greater will be the direct
eﬀect of the NFA position on the real exchange rate dynamics. Similarly, the
larger the cost of undertaking positions in the international ﬁnancial market,
δ, the greater the eﬀect of the NFA on the risk-sharing condition. Finally, if
either δ → 0 or bt =0at every period, the risk-sharing relationship boils down
to the bond economy.
3F e a t u r e s o f t h e D a t a
3.1 Data
All the data collected in the paper corresponds to quarterly series with the
exception of the net foreign asset position that is available only at annual fre-
cuency from 1973 to 1998. The series of consumption correspond quarterly series
of private non-durables ﬁnal consumption at constant prices, and were obtained
from the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) and IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS). The series were deﬂated by the corresponding im-
plicit price deﬂator for ﬁnal consumption, and then multiplied by the nominal
exchange rate to express them in terms of US constant dollars.
6The series of NFA positions were obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2001a)’s database. The NFAwere interpolated to get quarterly series by Chow
and Lin (1971)’s methodology.15 The variable was scaled by the GDP in current
dollars of the corresponding year. We complete the data for the period 1999 to
2001 using the quarterly cumulative current account.
B i l a t e r a lr e a le x c h a n g er a t e sa r ed e ﬁned as the nominal exchange rate times
the ratio of foreign to domestic prices. Nominal exchange rates were obtained
from the IFS, and prices are deﬁned as the implicit deﬂactors for the consump-
tion variables.
The real eﬀective exchange rate is obtained from the IFS for the period
1975.1-2001.4. In order to complete back the sample until 1973 we deﬁne the
real eﬀective exchange rate as the nominal eﬀective exchange rate times the
ratio of the aggregate OECD prices to domestic prices. The nominal eﬀective
exchange rates are taken from the IFS.
The interest rate corresponds to 3-months and 12-months euro-currency
yields expressed in annual terms, and were obtained from the Bank of Inter-
national Settlements´ database.
3.2 Description of the Data
Under the standard assumption of separability in the utility function and allow-
ing for PPP, a complete asset market assumption will imply a perfect cross-
correlation of consumptions across countries. In Table 1 we perform the cross-
country correlations of consumption growth rates. For most of the countries
this correlation is very low, and gets higher when it is calculated with respect
to the an aggregate of OECD consumption, consistent with Ravn’s ﬁndings.
A sw ep o i n t e do u ti nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n ,t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ei n t r o -
duces a wedge between the relative consumptions across countries, and there-
fore, consumption correlations do not necessarily have to be perfect. The bond
economy will predict a positive relation between the ﬂuctuations in the rela-
tive consumption growth rates and those of the real exchange rate. In Table
2 we calculate cross-correlations between bilateral (and eﬀective) real exchange
rates and consumption growths rates for twelve OECD economies for the period
1970.1- 2001.4.16 These cross-correlations are quite low and negative in most of
15We use the Current Account and/or the GDP as the related series.
16We deﬁne the relative consumption growth rate as the logarithm of the ﬁrst diﬀerence of
the consumption of country j minus the logarithm of the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the consumption of
7the cases, so it seems that the bond economy may not be supported by the data.
Econometric estimations by Ravn (2001) and Head et al (2002) also conﬁrm
this ﬁnding.17
The theory we test in this paper considers the NFA as a key determinant
of the lack of risk-sharing across countries (see equation 7). Figures 1 and 2
plot, for the period 1973-2001, the NFAposition vis a vis the real eﬀective and
bilateral exchange rate, respectively. The bold line represents the real exchange
rate and the dotted line stands for the NFA. Most of the real exchange rate
series exhibit large swings around a slowly drifting mean. The NFA drifts
upward for Japan, Norway and Switzerland, and downwards for Australia and
United States, with little trend in the remaining countries. The theory we test
in this work would predict a positive correlation between the expected growth
r a t eo ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea n dNFA.
Table 2 reports the correlations between the growth rate of the real exchange
rate and the NFA for the whole set of countries. The results are mixed with
positive and negative correlations, and most of them quite low. This is prelim-
inary evidence in favor of a theory in which the NFA m a yp l a yar o l ef o rs o m e
economies.
We perform a similar exercise for the UIP condition. In Table 3, we present
the cross-correlations of both interest rate diﬀerentials and NFApositions with
the change in the nominal exchange rate. The correlations are negative for most
of the countries when we use a short-term interest rate diﬀerential, although they
increase when we use the 12-months interest rate diﬀerential.18 On the other
hand, the NFA position is positively correlated with the expected change in
the exchange rate for 6 out of 14 countries.
The above evidence is suggestive indicating that the risk-sharing hypothesis
and the UIP condition may assign a role to the NFA position empirically.
However, the correlation analysis does not constitute a robust empirical testing.
the rest of the world. Consumption of the Rest of the World (RoW) is obtained by aggregating
the consumption of the Euro Area, Canada, Japan and US, and substracting the consumption
of the corresponding country j .
17Backus and Smith (1993) also report the consumption correlations against the standard
deviation of the bilateral real exchange rate, and ﬁnd no clear role of the real exchange rate
in explaining the lack of risk sharing.
18This may be evidence that the UIP holds at longer horizons (see Chinn and Meredith
(2002))
84 Empirical Discussion
Obstfeld (1989) ﬁrst derived and tested a risk sharing hypothesis in a set up
where PPP did not hold. Ravn, following a similar approach, also assumed
that countries can borrow and lend freely at the same nominal interest rate.
Both authors do not ﬁnd evidence in favor of the bond economy setup.19 Head
et al (2002) extended these previous works by testing utility functionals with
stochastic discount rates that are consistent with a stationary distribution of
wealth when markets are exogenously incomplete, and augmented utility with
external habit persistence as applied by Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Their
empirical ﬁndings do not support any of these extensions.
Our econometric approach will follow Kollmann (1995) who studied the re-
lation between consumption and the real exchange rate using the Generalized
Method of Moments estimation procedure (GMM).20 Although, our approach
diﬀers from Kollmann’s in several dimensions. First, we investigate a broader
data set. Second, we test a diﬀerent risk sharing condition in which the NFA
enters explicitly. Third, we also test the UIP condition that arises from the
asset market structure we suggest in section 2.
There are some reasons to believe that the current account indeed plays an
important role in the international transmission mechanism of shocks. Gagnon
(1996) present evidence of a signiﬁcant and robust long-run relationship between
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h eNFA. Recently, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000)
argue that the NFA has a strong impact on the relative price of non-traded
goods, and therefore, on the real exchange rate dynamics.21
With respect to the UIP, the hypothesis that interest rate diﬀerentials are
unbiased predictors of future exchange rate movements has been extensively
rejected in empirical studies. The UIP predicts that high yield currencies should
be expected to depreciate, and ceteris paribus, a real interest rate increase should
appreciate the currency. When ineﬃcient markets or short-term market frictions
prevent an immediate complete response of the exchange rate to an interest
rate change, short-term deviations of UIP may occur while long-horizons UIP
19In his sensitivity analysis, Ravn examines whether non-separabilities in the utility func-
tion, aggregations over diﬀerent types of goods, and habit persistence may be important in
explaining the risk sharing.
20Kollmann tests the bond economy for some OECD countries, and ﬁnds little support for
it in the line of posterior works.
21These authors argue that a model with only tradable goods may neglect the potential
impact on transfers from the relative price of non-traded goods.
9holds. Recently, CM tested the UIP hypothesis on longer-maturity bonds for
US, Germany, Japan and Canada, and ﬁnd evidence that the longer the maturity
the better the interest rate diﬀerential does explaining the future exchange rate
variations.22 They interpret this as meaning that any risk premium is very
stable over long horizons. Although, Bekaert et al (2002) ﬁnd that one reason
for Chinn and Meredith’s claim that UIP holds better at longer horizons is
simply a sample choice. Finally, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001b) ﬁnd a strong
long-run link between the real interest rate diﬀerential and the NFAfor a large
sample of countries.
5E c o n o m e t r i c I s s u e s
5.1 Persistence of the NFA
The NFAposition is a variable that exhibits high persistence in the data. The
largest autocorrelation root for most of the countries in our sample is in the
interval [0.9,0.98] (not reported to save space). This is not an isolated charac-
teristic of the NFA position, and is observed for a wide set of macroeconomic
variables (Stock and Watson (1996)).
On the other hand, we deal with a sample period that goes back until 1973.1
which limits the number of observations to no more than 100. In this context,
to rely in tests of the null hypothesis of a stationary process -as the KPSS
and LMC test- that are based on conventional asymptotic critical values may
mislead to reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, Caner and Kilian (2001) have
shown that tests that rely on the null hypothesis of unit root may overcome
this problem when one corrects the critical values for ﬁnite-sample or bootstrap
critical values.
T h u s ,w eu s et h ee ﬃcient DF-GLS test (Elliott et al (1996)) of the unit
root null hypothesis using ﬁnite-sample critical values. We follow closely Caner
and Kilian (2001) to create ﬁnite-sample critical values that we compare with
the statistic generated by the test. The results are reported in Table 4. After
applying the test to the NFA for the set of countries in our sample, we reject
the unit root null at the 10 percent for 7 out of 14 countries. The previous
result suggests that the NFA is not only theoretically, but also empirically
mean-reverting for some countries, and therefore, it is plausible that countries
22These authors use constant-maturity 5-year yields as a proxy for long maturities.
10that cannot reject the null of unit root are strongly inﬂuenced by a small sample
size problem.23
5.2 Estimation Procedure
We will use the GMM procedure developed by Hansen (1982). Under this esti-
mation procedure, we minimize a criterion function that is derived by imposing
at least as many moment conditions as parameters to be estimated.
It is well known that if the instruments are poorly correlated with the en-
dogenous variables, they provide limited ability to discriminate among various
parameter values, so GMM inferences are misleading and a weak identiﬁcation
result could arise. This problem cannot be avoided by enlarging the sample or
increasing the number of instruments as Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) point it
out. Despite the evolving nature of this literature, there are some useful meth-
ods to address concerns about weak identiﬁcation. Recently, Stock and Wright
(2002) developed a test to check for the presence of weak instruments. We will
follow these later authors, and implement a fully robust test for weak identiﬁca-
tion (S-set test). Under this test, we use the robust continuous-updating GMM




















Ψ is the set of parameters to be estimated, φt (Ψ)=h(Yt,Ψ) ⊗ Zt,w h e r e
h(Yt,Ψ) is the orthogonality condition and Zt is a vector of instruments; and
V (Ψ) is the robust variance covariance-matrix.
We will juxtapose the conventional 90% conﬁdence ellipse with the 90% S-
Set.T h i sS-Set contains all parameters that pass 90% χ2
k test, and is constructed
according to Theorem 2 in Stock and Wright. Loosely speaking, we would not
have weak instruments if the S-Set is contained in the 90% conﬁdence ellipse.
23The fact that for half of the sample of countries we deal with unit root series may cast
doubts about some of our results.
116R e s u l t s
6.1 Testing a Risk-Sharing condition under Imperfect Fi-
nancial Integration
Our incomplete and imperfect asset market structure delivers the following or-




t+1 − ∆b qt+1 + δbt
o
⊗ Zt =0 (8)
where Zt corresponds to the vector of instruments, ∆b CR
t+1 is the growth rate of
relative consumptions and ∆b qt+1 is the growth rate of the real exchange rate.
Finally, bt stands for the ratio of NFAin current dollars scaled by the GDP in
current dollars.
We examine the risk sharing condition, equation (8), using quarterly data
for a set of 12 countries. We perform three estimations. First, we consider the
real eﬀective exchange rate and relative consumption growth rates with respect
to the RoW. Second, we examine the same risk sharing in a country-pair basis
with respect to US. Finally, we perform a balanced panel for both cases.
The results of the estimation country-RoW are reported in Table 5. By way
of contrast, in the second and third columns we present the estimation that
corresponds to the bond economy. The estimated coeﬃcient of risk aversion, ρ,
is negative for seven of the twelve countries and is positive and signiﬁcant only in
two cases (Japan and Italy). The associated p-values of the J statistics are above
0.1 in all cases, so we do not reject the null of overidentifying restrictions. The
previous results suggest, at least, weak evidence in favor of the bond economy.
Next, we test the risk sharing relationship proposed in the paper, equation
(8). The results are in the last columns of Table 5. The ﬁrst striking result is
that the estimate of the risk-aversion parameter turns out to be positive and
signiﬁcant for seven out of twelve countries, which may suggest that the instru-
ments associated to the NFApositions are helping to identify the risk-aversion
parameter, and to capture some aspects of smooth consumption possibilities.25
The second result to highlight is the positive and signiﬁcant value of the cost
of bond holding parameter, δ, for ﬁve countries in the sample. The associated
24 b X stands for log-deviations around a well deﬁned steady state, and ∆ stands for the ﬁrst
diﬀerence operator. The results do not change signiﬁcantly after hp-ﬁltering the consumption
and real exchange rate series.
25Recent empirical evidence presented by Yogo (2002) locates the value of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution -inverse of the risk aversion parameter in our set up- below one.
12p-values of the J statistics are all above 0.10. Finally, it is worthwhile to notice
that for three countries (Australia, Japan and Norway) both parameters, ρ and
δ are positive and signiﬁcant.
We examine the possibility that the previous results may be driven by weak
identiﬁcation problems. To do so we construct the conventional 90% conﬁdence
ellipse with the 90% S-set described before. The results are summarized in
the last column of Table 5, and the S-set test are plotted in Figure 3.26 Under
the reasonable assumption that the risk-aversion parameter is not “too large” as
previous empirical evidence has suggested (see e.g. Yogo, 2002), our estimations
may not be driven by weak identiﬁcation.
The panel GMM estimation is reported in the last row of Table 5. Both the
coeﬃcient of risk aversion and the cost of bond holding parameter are signiﬁcant
and have the correct sign. Thus, we give support for a theory of imperfectly
integrated ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, we turn to the estimation of the country-by-country basis. Results
are reported in Table 6. Again in the second and third columns we report the
bond economy.T h ec o e ﬃcient of risk aversion is signiﬁcant, and has the correct
sign only for 3 out of 11 countries. For the other 8 countries, the parameter is
either not signiﬁcant or negative. When we include the NFA in the equilib-
rium condition we improve considerably the estimations. The estimate of the
risk-aversion parameter turns out to be positive and signiﬁcant for 8 out of 11
countries, and the estimate of the cost of bond holdings is also positive and sig-
niﬁcant for 7 countries.27 The associated p-values of the J statistics are above
0.10 in all cases. In most of the cases, 8 out of 11, our results are not driven by
weak identiﬁcation problems as it is shown in ﬁgure 4. Again, our panel results
support the theory since the estimates of parameters ρ and δ are positive and
signiﬁcant. The previous results may suggest that a theory of imperfect ﬁnan-
cial integration may work better in a country-by-country than in country-RoW
basis.
26The S-set consists of parameter values at which one fails to reject the join hypothesis
that the parameters are the true values and that the overidentifying conditions are valid. It
contains all parameters that pass the 90% χ2
k test, where k is the degree of freedom, and
therefore, contains the topology of the objective function. As a rule- of-thumb, if the S-sets
are unreasonably large, then the parameters are poorly identiﬁed. See Stock and Wright
(2000) for more details.
27A proper correction of the standard errors may be appealing when the series are very
persistent. However, so far we have not ﬁnd any method that could solve this problem under
GMM estimation.
13Overall, the tested risk-sharing condition works well. We have highlighted
t h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eNFA in explaining the lack of risk sharing across coun-
tries, and in general, the structural estimates for more than half of our countries
are in the line of what theory would predict. In a nutshell, it appears that growth
factors of consumption and real exchange rates behave in a manner which may
be consistent with the assumptions implicit in our incomplete and imperfect
market structure.
6.2 Testing the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ew a n tt oe x a m i n et h er o l eo ft h eNFA in explaining the UIP
condition in the short run rather than testing the UIP at diﬀerent horizons.28
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where Zt corresponds to the vector of instruments, ∆St+1 is the growth rate of
the bilateral nominal exchange rate, and
³
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´
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We estimate the UIP,equation (9), by GMM for two diﬀerent horizons with
3- and 12- maturity bonds (as in CM, 2002). At this stage, we do not claim
that the NFA may help to predict exchange rate movements, but we want to
assess whether there is a signiﬁcant role for the NFA in explaining exchange
rate movements as our theory would predict.29 In particular, we want to assess
the signiﬁcance and sign of the parameter δ in equation (9).
Using constant-maturity 3-months yields for 14 countries, we implement
regressions of the form of equation (9) over the 1980.1-2001.4. As a way of
contrast, we also display the estimates of the UIP condition analyzed in previous
studies. We use as a benchmark the results obtained by CM. They estimate the
UIP for short-term horizons -3-months and 12-months- for the Deutschemark,
Japanese yen, UK pound, French franc, Italian lira and Canadian dollar. In our
exercises we have used exactly the same data set as CM. The exchange rates
28To operationalize the convet, UIP is generally tested jointly with the assumption of
rational expectations in exchange markets.
29In a seminal paper, Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) ﬁnd that the predictions of a random walk
dominates those of their regressions based on fundamentals f o rt h r e em a y o rc u r r e n c i e sa t6 -
and 12-months horizons. It is worth stressing that in this section our intention is not to assess
how economic fundamentals, in particular NFA, predict exchange rates.
14of each country were expressed in terms of the US dollars, and the 3- and 12-
months movements in the exchange rate were regressed against diﬀerential in
euro currency yields of the corresponding maturity. Since 12-horizon data at a
quarterly frecuency may led to MA(3) in the residuals, we use the Newey-West
correction to get robust standard errors.
The results reported in Table 7 present the estimations for 3-months ma-
turity. The ﬁrst column shows that the UIP condition is rejected in most of
the countries when the NFA position is not included as a regressor, which is
in the line with the results reported by CM.30 The estimate slope coeﬃcient,
β, has negative sign for 12 out of 14 countries. Only France and Italy present
coeﬃcients that are not statistically diﬀerent than one. The second and third
columns of Table 7 present the estimate slope and risk-premium coeﬃcients of
the UIP condition, equation (9). The ﬁrst remarkably result is that the para-
meter δ is positive and signiﬁcant for 5 countries. Moreover, for 3 economies
(Finland, France and Italy) both the slope and the risk-premium coeﬃcients
have the right sign and are signiﬁcant at 10 percent level. The previous ﬁnding
stands in contrast with CM that report the failure of the UIP for most of the
currencies analyzed at 3-months horizons. On the other hand, for Sweden and
Japan the risk-premium coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant, although the slope
coeﬃcient has the wrong sign. For the rest of the countries, we observe that the
slope coeﬃcient moves on the right direction, but the risk-premium parameter
has the wrong sign and/or is positive but not signiﬁcant.
We perform the same estimation for longer maturity bonds, and the results
at 12-months maturity are shown in Table 8. Again, we ﬁnd some support for
our theory. The slope parameter is signiﬁcant and has the correct sign for seven
countries. These results improve slightly with respect to the 3-months horizon.
The risk-premium parameter is also positive for 7 countries, and is signiﬁcant
for ﬁve of them.
In a nutshell, it seems that NFA may be useful predictors of short-term
movements in exchange rate for some countries, and they are likely to explain
the observed variance in exchange rates for the period analyzed. Even though,
our ﬁndings suggest that the NFAmay not be an appropriate measure of time-
30The results conﬁrm the failure of the UIP similar to other studies by Froot and Thaler
(1990). If UIP holds, the slope coeﬃcient should not be statistically diﬀerent that one.
Regarding the constant term, non-zero values may be explained by Jensen’s inequality, and
are not shown to save space.
15varying risk premium for an important subsample of countries.
6.3 Joint Test of the Risk-Sharing and the UIP
We also perform a tighter test of the imperfect and incomplete asset market
structure presented in section 2. We implement a joint GMM estimation of
the risk sharing and UIP equilibrium conditions. Under the joint estimation,
we impose the risk premium parameter, δ, to be the same in both equations.
One of the limitations of this approach is that the sample size is limited to
t h es a m p l ep e r i o du s e di nt h eUIP estimation while we increase the number of
moment conditions and parameters to be estimated. To do a balance estimation
we restrict to 10 the number of countries in the sample. Results are reported in
Table 9.
The estimated risk aversion parameter, ρ, is positive and signiﬁcant for seven
countries. On the other hand, the slope coeﬃcient of the UIP condition has
the right sign for 4 countries. Finally, parameter δ that intends to capture the
time varying risk premium generated by the NFA is signiﬁcant at 10 percent
for 5 economies.
The results of these estimations seem to point out in two directions. Firstly,
there is a signiﬁcant role for the NFA position in explaining the lack of risk
sharing across countries. Secondly, there seems to be a signiﬁcant link between
the UIP puzzle and the apparent lack of risk sharing across countries.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has looked to the empirical implications of incomplete asset markets
and imperfect ﬁnancial integration in explaining both the apparent lack of risk
sharing across countries and the UIP failure. The empirical failure of most
of the theoretical models under the assumption of perfect integration, even
when it is allowed for both exogenously and endogenously incomplete markets,
habit persistence and diﬀerent forms of utility functions, has been extensively
documented. Recent evidence on the importance of the NFA in explaining
the transmission of shocks across countries has suggested us to consider the
implications of imperfect ﬁnancial integration in international macroeconomics.
The results of the paper contrast with those of previous studies based on the
assumption of complete markets. Firstly, we ﬁnd evidence that growth factors of
16consumption and real exchange rates may behave in a manner which is consistent
with a signiﬁcant role for the NFA f o ral a r g es a m p l eo fO E C Dc o u n t r i e s .I n
this sense, the NFA is a key element in explaining the apparent lack of risk
sharing across countries. Secondly, for a small group of countries, the NFA
captures a time-varying risk-premium and yields a positive slope coeﬃcient for
the interest rate diﬀerential at short-term horizons which stands in contrast with
Chinn and Meredith (2002)’s ﬁndings. In this sense, the interest rate diﬀerential
could be a useful predictor of short-term movements in the nominal exchange
rate when it is accompanied by the NFA position.
In a nutshell, it seems reasonable to consider a theory where the NFAposi-
tion aﬀects both the risk-sharing across countries and the UIP condition. Our
ﬁndings would suggest that since the NFA helps to explain nominal exchange
rate movements, an important avenue to investigate is the predictability power
of the NFA following Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983)´s seminal contribution. In this
line, to overcome the high persistence of the NFAin the empirical testing by a
suitable transformation may be a good alternative.
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Notes:  - Series of consumption correspond to private non-durable final consumption obtained from OECD´s
   Quarterly National Accounts and IMF´s International Financial Statistics.
Austria Canada Finland France Italy Japan Norway Spain Switzerland U.Kingdom US OECD
A u s t r a l i a 0 , 1 10 , 1 40 , 3 70 , 0 50 , 1 50 , 0 4 - 0 , 0 80 , 3 3 0 , 3 2 0 , 1 4 - 0 , 0 30 , 1 5
A u s t r i a 0 , 0 20 , 0 00 , 0 00 , 2 00 , 0 50 , 0 40 , 3 3 0 , 2 1 0 , 0 40 , 0 20 , 1 7
Canada 0,06 0,11 0,28 0,06 -0,11 0,29 0,11 0,26 0,36 0,31
Finland -0,24 0,12 0,08 0,17 0,33 0,34 0,54 0,14 0,34
France 0,00 0,23 -0,68 0,01 -0,17 0,07 0,13 0,08
Italy 0,03 0,06 0,51 0,36 0,15 -0,10 0,32
Japan -0,17 0,10 0,05 0,17 0,17 0,22
Norway 0,04 -0,01 -0,05 0,02 -0,09
Spain 0,30 0,26 0,11 0,44
Switzerland 0,09 -0,07 0,22
U.Kingdom 0,36 0,47
US 0,28Table 2. Unconditional Correlations 1973.1-2001.4: Risk Sharing
Country Correlation of the Change in Real      Correlation of the Change in Real
 Effective exchange rate with




t+1,i   bt,i       ∆C
R-US
t+1,i       bt,i
Australia -0.02 -0.04  0.01  0.07
Austria -0.18 -0.05 -0.23 -0.11
Canada -0.11  0.04 -0.20  0.00
Finland  0.02  0.00  0.30  0.05
France -0.02 -0.06  0.51  0.01
Italy    0.04 -0.06  0.32 -0.07
Japan    0.18 -0.04  0.16  0.04
Norway    0.01 -0.14  0.35  0.09
Spain -0.19 -0.14  0.44 -0.16
Switzerland -0.06 -0.16  0.35 -0.22
U.Kingdom  0.03  0.12 -0.19 -0.15
US -0.10  0.01    -    -
Notes: -  ∆C
R-ROW
i is the relative consumption growth rate of country i with respect to the Rest of the World
- ∆C
R-US
i is the relative consumption growth rate of country i with respect to United States (US).
- bi corresponds to the ratio NFA/GDP of country i .
a  We use the multilateral effective real exchange rate of country i .
b  We use the bilateral real exchange rate of country i with respect to US.          Table 3. Unconditional Correlations 1973.1-2001.4: Uncovered Interest Parity
 Correlation of the Change in Nominal Exchange Rate with
a:
   Country
  ∆it,i
R-3m ∆it,i
R-12m   bt,i      
   Australia    0.06 -0.53 -0.10
   Austria   -0.12  0.14 -0.11
   Canada   -0.10 -0.18  0.03
   Finland     0.33  0.15  0.06
   France   -0.11  0.36  0.05
   Germany   -0.12  0.26 -0.10
   Italy    0.10  0.38 -0.05  
   Japan   -0.42 -0.06  0.09
   Netherlands   -0.17  0.10 -0.08
   Norway   -0.16 -0.09  0.05
   Spain    0.08  0.27 -0.11  
   Switzerland   -0.18 -0.01 -0.14
   Sweden   -0.09 -0.06  0.16





 are the 3- and 12-months interest rate
differentials in euro currency yields of country i.
- bi corresponds to NFA/GDP of country i.
a Corresponds to the change in the bilateral nominal exchange rate
of country i with respect to US.  The change in the nominal
exchange rate corresponds to the same maturity of the interest rate
differential.Table 4. DF-GLS Test for the Net Foreign Asset Position
        
Country  DF-GLS  Reject I(1) null  (5 or 10%) 
a Sample Period
Australia -1.732 yes 1973:1 – 2001:4
Austria -4.562 yes  1973:1 – 2001:4
Canada -1.693 yes  1973:4 – 1997:3
Finland -1.879 yes 1973:1 – 2001:4
France -1.715 yes 1973:1 – 2000:4
Germany -0.516 no 1973:1 – 2001:4
Italy -0.437 no 1973:1 – 2001:4
Japan    0.002 no 1973:1 – 2001:4
Netherlands -0.433 no 1973:1 – 2001:4
Norway  0.354 no 1973:1 – 2001:4
Spain -1.881 yes 1973:1 – 2000:4
Sweden -0.165 no 1980:4 – 2001.4
Switzerland -0.948 no 1973:1 – 2001:4
U.Kingdom -1.801 yes 1973:1 – 2001:4
Notes: - We allowed for 8 lags to construct the statistic and the finite sample critical values.










t))   =   qt+1-qt   -   δ bt (2)
        (1)   (2)
 Country ρ       J-stat      ρ         δ J-stat   S-Set
Country-RoW
Australia -0.198       0.80 2.504***   0.006** 0.80 No empty
 (1.247)  (0.621) (0.003)
Austria 0.234       0.15 1.204* -0.022** 0.72 Empty
 (0.556)  (0.494) (0.005)
Canada 1.449       0.94 1.328* -0.001 0.91 Empty
 (1.443)  (0.775) (0.004)
Finland -1.308*     0.54 -2.005*** -0.008 0.61 Empty
 (0.767)  (0.548) (0.004)
France -0.384      0.85 -0.746***   0.071*** 0.78 Empty
 (0.570)  (0.257) (0.023)
Italy 0.883**     0.50 0.499**   0.025 0.71 No empty
 (0.392)  (0.294) (0.020)
Japan 2.643***   0.44 2.995***   0.018* 0.98 No empty
 (1.157)  (0.655) (0.011)
Norway -0.101      0.54 0.335**   0.007** 0.85 No empty
 (0.450)  (0.168) (0.003)
Spain -2.17***   0.66 -2.061**   0.012* 0.60 No empty
 (0.642)  (0.441) (0.006)
Switzerland 0.914      0.51 1.822*** -0.003 0.74 Empty
 (0.568)  (0.441) (0.004)
U.Kingdom -1.589      0.64 -1.412   0.017 0.14 No empty
 (1.470)  (1.195) (0.016)
United States -0.276      0.95 -2.641*** -0.014* 0.93 No empty
 (1.022)  (0.571) (0.007)
Panel 
a 0.335**    0.35  0.623***   0.001** 0.97
 (0.133)  (0.023) (0.000)
Notes:  -      Estimations by GMM. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis and
       were modified by Newey-West correction.
-  Instruments are lagged relative consumption growth rate, lagged real exchange growth rate and lags
of net foreign asset position.
-  J-Statistic is the significance level of a test of the overidentifying restrictions. S-set tests for weak
instruments: “empty” set implies weak identification.
*, (**), [***] Significance at 10%, (5%), [1%].










t))   =   qt+1-qt   -     δ bt (4)
(3)   (4)
 Country ρ     J-stat    ρ    δ J-stat   S-Set
Country-USA
Australia -0.273       0.25 1.583***  0.004* 0.95 No empty
 (0.781)  (0.465) (0.003)
Austria 0.799       0.74 1.939* -0.031 0.77 No empty
 (0.556)  (1.022) (0.021)
Canada -2.212**   0.29 -0.496  0.004** 0.81 No empty
 (1.085)  (0.394) (0.002)
Finland 0.946**     0.30 1.264*** -0.007 0.70 No empty
 (0.365)  (0.372) (0.007)
France -0.040      0.97 0.484**  0.089* 0.95 No empty
 (0.493)  (0.210) (0.053)
Italy 0.212      0.78 0.312**  0.060* 0.88 No empty
 (0.237)  (0.154) (0.032)
Japan 2.320**    0.40 3.727***  0.044*** 0.28 Empty
 (0.933)  (0.933) (0.017)
Norway 0.106      0.64 -0.076  0.015** 0.88 No empty
 (0.332)  (0.235) (0.006)
Spain 1.041***   0.46 1.118*** -0.038*** 0.65 Empty
 (0.315)  (0.225) (0.013)
Switzerland 0.092      0.79 1.004***   0.010* 0.60 Empty
 (0.293)  (0.146) (0.005)
U. Kingdom -0.484      0.49 0.636 -0.039** 0.60 No empty
 (1.522)  (0.670) (0.019)
Panel 1/ 0.119      0.29 0.529**  0.003** 0.77
 (0.116)  (0.046) (0.001)
Notes:  -      Estimations by GMM. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis and
       were modified by the Newey-West correction.
-  Instruments are lagged relative consumption growth rate, lagged real exchange growth rate and lags
of net foreign asset position.
-  J-Statistic is the significance level of a test of the overidentifying restrictions. S-set tests for weak
instruments: “empty” set implies weak identification.
*, (**), [***] Significance at 10%, (5%), [1%].
a      All countries but USA and Australia.Table 7. Uncovered Interest Parity: Maturity 3 months
∆St,t+k                 =     α    +    β (it,k – i
*
t,k)  +  εt,k              (5)
∆St,t+k                 =     α    +    β (it,k – i
*
t,k)  + δ bt,k   +  εt,k    (6)
       (5)              (6)
Country               Maturity: 3 months
Estimate β  Estimate β   Estimate δ
Australia -0.302***  -0.371***    -0.115
(0.457)   (0.452)    (0.126)
Austria -1.047*** -1.286        0.287
(0.667)  (0.876)    (0.591)
Canada -0.706***  -1.236***     0.033
(0.289)   (0.312)    (0.109)
Finland -1.047***   2.189       1.189
   
(1.028)  (1.243)    (0.236)
France -0.191   1.346            2.471
   
(0.957)  (1.109)         (0.993)
Germany -0.865***   0.102        -1.176
  
(0.944)  (0.848)         (0.471)
Italy  0.856    2.543**       2.081
   
(0.662)  (0.733)        (0.584)
Japan -5.777***  -4.198***     0.558
   
(0.935)   (0.730)    (0.243)
Netherlands -1.728***  -1.143***      -0.333
(0.841)  (0.650)      (0.376)
Norway -0.982***  -1.024***      -0.023
(0.621)  (0.633)      (0.076)
Spain 0.817  1.067      -0.337
(0.553)  (0.642)        (0.457)
Sweden -2.831***  -2.822***        0.587
   
(0.923)   (0.926)       (0.262)
Switzerland -1.587***  -0.875**       -0.355
(0.686)  (1.019)      (0.374)
UK -2.090***  -1.259**      -0.230
(1.013)   (0.941)     (0.271)
Notes: - Estimations by GMM. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis and
  were modified by the Newey-West correction.
- All p-values of J- statistics are above 0.1.
- Bilateral Nominal Exchange Rate in terms of US dollars. Interest Rate differential in Eurocurrency yields.
    *(**)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%].
 (
  )[
   ] Different from null of zero at 10%(5%)[1%].Table 8. Uncovered Interest Parity: Maturity 12 months
    ∆St,t+k              =     α    +    β (it,k – i
*
t,k)  +  εt,k             (7)
∆St,t+k             =     α    +    β (it,k – i
*
t,k)  + δ bt,k   +  εt,k     (8)
       (7)                                 (8)
Country          Maturity: 12 months
Estimate β Estimate β   Estimate  δ
Australia -2.306***   -3.667***    -0.592
   
(0.650)   (0.656)     (0.222)
Austria 0.342   1.715    -1.214
   
(0.955)  (0.856)      (0.273)
Canada  0.085***    0.001***     0.094
(0.145)   (0.152)     (0.113)
Finland  1.071   2.378      0.972
   
(1.067)  (1.016)     (0.377)
France  1.675   1.152           1.841
 
(0.396)  (0.379)        (1.157)
Germany -0.776***   0.082       -1.617
   
(0.811)  (0.650)        (0.353)
Italy  0.856   1.694      1.278
 
(0.662)  (0.263)       (0.840)
Japan -0.276***    2.778***      0.775
   
(0.600)   (1.254)     (0.273)
Netherlands -1.353***  -0.972      1.741
(0.787)  (1.995)     (2.529)
Norway  0.420   0.422     -0.021
(0.512)  (0.725)     (0.160)
Spain 1.682   2.612**     -1.303
  
(0.523)  (0.697)      (0.622)
Sweden -0.864***  -0.826***      0.626
  
(0.586)  (0.480)     (0.315)
Switzerland -0.948***  -1.086**     -0.415
  
(0.872)  (0.810)     (0.193)
UK -1.043***   1.133     -0.699
   
(0.560)   (0.580)     (0.271)
Notes: - Estimations by GMM. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis and
  were modified by the Newey-West correction.
- All p-values of J- statistics are above 0.1.
- Bilateral Nominal Exchange Rate in terms of US dollars. Interest Rate differential in Eurocurrency yields.
     *(**)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%].
 (
  )[
   ] Different from null of zero at 10%(5%)[1%].Table 9. Joint Estimation of the UIP and Risk-Sharing Condition.
ρ[Ct+1 - Ct - (C*t+1 - C*t )]  -  (qt+1- qt )   +  δbt       =      0
                       α  +  β (it,k – i
*
t,k)  +  δbt,k   -  ∆St,t+k      =      0
          Joint Estimation        
Country  Estimate ρ   Estimate β Estimate δ
Australia   -0.254     0.445  -0.013
   
  (1.328)     (0.401)  (0.004)
Austria   3.979
     -0.742**  -0.074
   
  (2.323)     (0.273)  (0.031)
Canada    1.164
       -0.758***  -0.007
 
  (0.152)     (0.214)  (0.004)
France  -0.738
     -1.019
***   0.140
  
 (0.395)      (0.670)  (0.064)
Italy   1.141
         0.746   0.072
 
 (0.271)      (0.545)  (0.048)
Japan    2.238
       -4.426***   0.079
   
  (0.454)     (0.758)  (0.011)
Norway   0.094      1.033   0.011
 
 (0.179)     (0.536)  (0.006)
Spain   0.898
        1.659  -0.039
  
 (0.431)      (0.423)  (0.016)
Switzerland   2.194
        -1.955
***   0.025
   
 (0.333)     (0.342)  (0.005)
UK  -1.821    -1.336**  -0.009
  (1.219)     (0.833)  (0.020)
Notes: - Estimations by GMM. Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis and
  were modified by the Newey-West correction.
- All p-values of J- statistics are above 0.1.
- Bilateral Nominal Exchange Rate in terms of US dollars. 3-months Interest Rate differential in
     Eurocurrency yields.
    *(**)[***] Different from null of unity at 10%(5%)[1%].
 (
  )[
   ] Different from null of zero at 10%(5%)[1%].Figure1: Real Effective Exchange Rate vs Net Foreign Assets*



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0,25Figure 2: Bilateral Real Exchange Rate vs Net Foreign Assets*














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0,90Figure 3: S-Set for Risk Sharing  with the Rest of the World Estimation
Australia Austria Canada Finland
France Italy Japan Norway
Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United Statets
Note: Join S-set (shaded) and 90% confidence ellipse.Figure:4 S-set for the Bilateral Risk-Sharing Estimation
Australia Austria Canada Finland
France Italy Japan Norway
Spain Switzerland United Kingdom
Note: Join S-set (shaded) and 90% confidence ellipse.Documentos de Trabajo
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